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ABSTRACT 
 
This article aims to investigate the influencing factors of the extent of web-based disclosure among 
Indonesian manufacturing firms. Measurement of dependent variable (extent of web-based disclosure) 
relies on instrument developed by Matherly and Burton (2005). Four independent variables are 
hypothesized to positively influence the dependent variable: profitability (proxied by ROA), percentage of 
public ownership, firm size (average total assets), and level of leverage. The  regression analysis finds 
that all independent variables (except percentage of public ownership) positively affect the extent of web-
based disclosure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The emergence and growth of internet dras-
tically facilitates firm to communicate with broader 
audience through their website. This fact enables 
website to serve as improvement of firms’ image, a 
marketing device, or means to transfer firm-related 
information. 
Website as informational device has two 
advantages that are absent in conventional (print-
based) ones. Firstly, information contained in 
corporate website can be accessed throughout the 
world at significantly low cost. Secondly, it is more 
possible for firms to continously update their infor-
mation also at low cost. These mutual advantages 
give way to growing reliance on internet for 
informational device. 
Since internet was first developed in US, the 
utilization of internet by firms is much more rapid 
in US (and in any other developed countries) than 
in Indonesia. While it can be said that most of all 
US publicly listed firms have their own websites, 
recent research shows that there are still 49 
Indonesian publicly listed manufacturing firms 
(from total of 147 firms) that still do not possess 
their corporate website (Prabowo and Tambotoh 
2005).  
Firms are now also using their websites to 
communicate their information to their existing 
and potential stakeholders. By doing so it is 
expected that stakeholders are able to receive 
required information much more timely. Infor-
mation displayed to the stakeholders can be in 
quantitative (whether financial or non-financial) or 
qualitative.  
Accounting research in the utilization of 
corporate website as a tool to disclose information 
began to emerge in the end of 1990s. The 
pioneering articles, however, are still descriptive or 
explorative (Pirchegger and Wagenhoffer 1999; 
Gowthorpe and Amat 1999; Hedlin 1999). Infe-
rential research on this issue began to emerge in 
the 2000s. Scholars usually investigate two 
different internet-related variables in their articles: 
internet financial reporting (IFR – to what extent 
firms incorporate their financial statements in 
their corporate website) or internet-based disclo-
sure (to what extent firms disclose their infor-
mation, financial and/or nonfinancial, in their 
website). Although these variables are different, 
they are the same at one point: IFR and web-based 
disclosure are both voluntary disclosure practices. 
IFR is voluntary not because of the content of 
information, but because securities market regu-
lator does not stipulate firms to inform their 
financial statements in their website (even the 
possession of website is neither stipulated). On the 
other hand, web-based disclosure is voluntary 
because of both the content of information and the 
way information is transferred (through internet).  
Since the internet-related variables are regard-
ed as voluntary disclosure practices, scholars 
investigate factors affecting these variables by 
usually employing independent variables used in 
research on conventional voluntary disclosure 
(Debreceny et al, 2002; Ettredge et al, 2002; 
Oyelere et al, 2003; Prabowo and Tambotoh, 2005;  
Xiao et al , 2005). However, research on this issue 
using Indonesian context is still very rare. To our 
best knowledge, only Prabowo and Tambotoh 
(2005) investigate this issue in Indonesian context. 
This article aims to investigate factors affecting 
web-based dislosure. Although our independent 
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variables are the same as Prabowo and Tam-
botoh’s, ours is different from Prabowo and 
Tambotoh (2005) in one point: ours examines web-
based disclosure while Prabowo and Tambotoh 
(2005) IFR.  
This article is organized as follows. The next 
section will be literature review and hypothesis 
development. Research method will be discussed in 
the subsequent section. Findings and discussion 
will follow. This article is closed by conclusion, 
limitations of the research and research implica-
tion.  
 
AGENCY THEORY, INFORMATION 
PROBLEM THEORY AND VOLUNTARY 
DISCLOSURE 
The practice of voluntary disclosure is usually 
explained by two economics-based theories: agency 
theory and signaling theory or information problem 
theory (Healy and Palepu 2001; Xiao et al. 2004). 
Voluntary disclosure is aimed to solve the ex-ante 
(information problem) and ex-post (agency problem) 
problems at once. The problems create the 
suboptimal allocation of resources in the capital 
market.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) lay the corners-
tone of agency theory in the domain of economics. 
However, they really lend the basic idea from 
previous researchers investigating the human 
behaviour in economic terms. Agency theory basi-
cally assumes that everyone is selfish (pursuing 
her self-interests). When she is confronted with 
with alternative set of actions and/ or  conditions to 
choose, she will be most probably to choose the one 
benefiting her most, even if the action/ condition 
can potentially bring disadvantages to others.  
In the context of modern firms, there exists 
separation of ownership (principals) and control 
(agents). Since principals cannot perfectly monitor 
agents’ behaviour and agents are selfish, agents 
have strong incentives to act for their own interests 
at the expense of principals’. Agency theory is ex-
post since it exists after the formation of firms. 
In publicly listed firms, the agency problem  is 
complicated  by the fact that there exist many and 
geographically dispersed owners (shareholders). 
Dispersed shareholders with minor ownership 
hinders further control of agents’ action since it is 
very difficult and costly for shareholders to monitor 
and control agents’ behaviour individually.  Mana-
gers lack incentive to maximize firms’ value 
(shareholders’ interests) since their wealth is not 
affected by the maximization of firms’ value. They 
even have incentives to maximize their interests 
(in the form of shirking, pecuniary and non-
financial benefit) at the expense of shareholders’ 
interests.   
Financial statements are one main device to 
reduce the agency problem, although there are 
other forms of mechanism (such as efficient market 
for corporate control, governmental regulation, 
efficient job market for managers, and managerial 
stock ownership program). By forcing managers to 
prepare standardized financial statements, 
shareholders can monitor and control managers’ 
action with the proxy of firms’ financial perfor-
mance.  
Since firms’ performance are not only financial 
and financial performance are also affected by 
other, non-financial performance, there exist 
growing requirements for managers to not only 
disclose financial information (in the form of 
financial statements), but also nonfinancial infor-
mation and/or other financial information (such as 
history of share price). Most of nonfinancial 
information are not stipulated to be disclosed these 
information at their annual report. It is expected 
that by disclosing additional (not mandated) 
information  managers and principals can reduce 
agency costs (Healy and Palepu 2001; Botosan 
2003).  
Information problem is the opposite of agency 
problem. Ackerlof (1970) is instrumental in 
establishing the theory. It exists before investors 
put their money into certain firms. Therefore it is 
called ex-ante problem. Information problem exists 
because outsiders (investors) have no or limited 
information to assess the quality of firms, forcing 
them to value all the firms at average level. “Good” 
firms will then be undervalued by investors’ action. 
Since no one firm is willing to be undervalued, 
”good” firms go out from markets. Investors  are 
now finding only bad firms in the market. This 
condition leads them to rate down further their 
valuation of existing firms and finally discouraging 
further the “good” firms to enter the market. At the 
extreme illustration, only “bad” firms will exist at 
the market; forcing the “good’ ones to leave the 
market. Investing in firms using market mecha-
nism will be extremely risky and not profitable. 
Ultimately, no one investor is willing to invest at 
the market.  
In such imperfect market condition, “good” 
firms have strong incentives to disclose more 
information to potential investors to disassociate 
them from the “bad’ ones. Disclosing more 
(financial and nonfinancial information) to poten-
tial investors can reduce the information problem. 
Potential investors are now much more informed 
and knowledgeable in order to invest in “good” 
firms only. In other words, voluntary disclosure can 
potentially reduce the information problem.  
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A lot of scholars analyze voluntary disclosure 
practice using variables derived from these two 
economics-based theories. Oyelere et al (2003) 
extensively enlist previous articles investigating 
factors affecting the extent voluntary disclosure 
practice. They find that there are six most 
frequently determining variables of voluntary 
disclosures: firm size, audit size/quality, listing 
status, profitability, leverage, and industry type. 
We argue further (after investigating their list of 
research) that ownership structure are also 
frequently determinants of the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
WEB-BASED DISCLOSURE 
If we discuss voluntary disclosure, we actually 
refer to traditional (print-based) disclosure device. 
It is understandable since printed media has been 
the main (if not the only) device to communicate 
firm-related information for long time.  
Web-based disclosure offers advantages that 
are absent in paper-based voluntary disclosure: it 
can be accessed globally at much lower costs and it 
can be updated much more timely also at much 
lower costs. For example, daily information such as 
share price of the firm can be informed daily in the 
firm’s website.  Firms can also disclose their latest 
products or  other achievements in their websites 
rather than in printed annual report. 
Although the two theories are usually employ-
ed to investigate traditional or paper-based volun-
tary disclosure, they are also used in web-based 
disclosure since the latter is basically the special 
form of voulntary disclosure (Debreceny et al, 2002; 
Ettredge et al, 2002; Xiao et al, 2004, Prabowo and 
Tambotoh 2005). Web-based disclosure is volun-
tary one since it is not mandated by accounting 
regulator (even the possesion of website is neither 
mandated).  
Scholars usually differentiate web-based dis-
closure from internet financial reporting (IFR) 
practice, although both practices involve internet to 
disseminate information. IFR refers to incorporate-
on of financial statements (whether in complete 
form or in summary) in firms’ website while web-
based disclosure refers to dissemination of financial 
and nonfinancial information in firms’ website. 
Both practice are voluntary. IFR is voluntary not 
because of the content of information, but because 
securities market regulator does not stipulate firms 
to inform their financial statements in their 
website (even the possession of website is neither 
stipulated). On the other hand, web-based disclo-
sure is voluntary because of both the content of 
information and the way information is transferred 
(through internet). Although they are both volun-
tary in nature, web-based disclosure is much 
broader than IFR. 
 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The relationship between profitability and 
level of web-based disclosure can be explained by 
information problem theory. Using the latter one, 
we can argue that profitability is good news for 
investors. It is also a signal of managers’ skills. 
They have incentive to dissacosiate their firms 
from the less profitable firms. They also expect that 
more investors are willing to invest in their firms, 
which eventually leads to reduction of cost of equity 
capital. Managers of profitable firms are therefore 
more willing to disclose more to signal the good 
news to market in the form of more extensive 
voluntary disclosure or using novel technology 
(such as web-based disclosure).  
In the context of conventionally voluntary 
disclosure, Patton and Zelenka (1997), Raffournier 
(1995) and Owusu-Ansah (1998) support the 
hypothesis. In the context of web-based disclosure, 
Prabowo and Tambotoh (2005) also support the 
hypothesis. Based on the previous discussion, the 
first hypothesis will be: 
Ha1: Profitbility positively affects the extent of 
web-based disclosure. 
 
Public ownership refers to shareholders with 
small percentage of shares. Those shareholders are 
minority ones and have less powerful and more 
limited access to firms’ information because they 
have less resources to monitor managers’ behave-
our; creating greater agency problems. Texts on 
agency theory argue that majority shareholders 
are potential to exploit minority shareholders in 
the form of transfer of wealth from the later to the 
former. This action is usually in cooperation with 
the managers (Marston and Polei, 2004; Oyelere et 
al, 2003). Firms with more public ownership are 
therefore more potential to be comprehensively 
scrutinized (such as by regulators, analysts or 
press). Consequently, the managers have more 
incentive to disclose more their (financial) infor-
mation or to disclose in novel device (such as web-
based disclosure) in order to reduce the agency 
problems.  
Higher percentage of public ownership also 
potentially means more geographically dispersed 
shareholders since firms have more shareholders. 
It is more difficult to communicate with such 
condition using conventional device (print-based 
one). Utilization of internet (such as web-based 
disclosure) is more potential in firms with higher 
percentage of public ownership. 
In the context of conventionally voluntary 
disclosure, Cooke (1991) and Malone et al (1993) 
support the hypothesis. The previous research in 
the context of web-based disclosure show mixed 
Prabowo: Factors Influencing The Extent of Web-Based Disclosure 
Jurusan Ekonomi Akuntansi, Fakultas Ekonomi - Universitas Kristen Petra 
http://www.petra.ac.id/~puslit/journals/dir.php?DepartmentID=AKU 
95
evidence, however. Prabowo and Tambotoh (2005) 
cannot support the hypothesis while Oyelere et al 
(2003) can. Therefore, the second hypothesis  will 
be: 
Ha2: Percentage of public ownership positively  
affects  the extent of web-based disclosure. 
 
Larger firms potentially have larger agency 
costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) or political costs 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) than the smaller 
ones. Larger firms have more resources at stake; 
creating more risks for the shareholders (prince-
pals). Shareholders of larger firms therefore have 
more incentives to exert  their power to press the 
managers to disclose more information to them.  
Broader stakeholders (such as governmental 
agencies, press, and NGOs) also more probably put 
pressures to larger firms involving various issues, 
such as environment, labor, tax, compliance, ethics, 
and social responsibility. Larger  firms therefore 
incur higher political costs. They can reduce the 
political costs by disclosing more of their infor-
mation to wider array of stakeholders to notify 
them that the firms have “done more and better”, 
especially in the context of corporate social 
responsibility. 
Larger firms  also incur less marginal costs of 
producing information than the smaller ones 
(Marston and Polei, 2004). It is cheaper for larger 
firms to disclose more information (as in 
conventionally voluntary disclosure) or to disclose 
in novel device (such as web-based disclosure).   
This condition induces managers of larger firms to 
disclose more (either in print-based device or web-
based device) their firms’ information. 
Most articles find supporting evidence for this 
hypothesis (Debreceny et al, 2002; Ettredge et al, 
2002; Oyelere et al, 2003; Prabowo and Tambotoh 
2005). 
Ha3: Firm size positively  affects  the extent of web-
based disclosure. 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that firms 
with high level of leverage ratio incur higher 
monitoring costs due to potential conflict between 
shareholders and debtholders. Shareholders, as 
residual claimants, have incentives to urge mana-
gers to take high-risk investment opportunity or to 
provide excessive return to shareholders at the 
expense of debtholders. If the high-risk investment 
fails, both debtholders and shareholders bear the 
loss (in the form of default loan and lost invested 
fund). On the contrary, only shareholders benefit 
from successful investments in the form of higher 
returns. Debtholders cannot enjoy the successful 
investment since they are fixed claimants 
(receiving fixed payment on interest). Provision of 
excessive return to shareholders  can reduce firms’ 
ability to repay the debt and the interests; 
increasing the default risk borne by debtholders 
(Barnea et al, 1985).  
Considering the increasing agency problems in 
the more leveraged firms, debtholders have more 
incentives to push managers to reduce the agency 
problems. One of the devices that can potentially 
reduce the agency problem borne by debtholders 
are voluntary disclosure (whether print-based or 
web-based). Disclosure facilitates debtholders to 
monitor managers’ (and shareholders’s)  actions.  
Ha4: Leverage level positively affects the extent of 
web-based disclosure. 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Dependent variable (level of web-based disclo-
sure) is measured by instruments developed by 
Matherly and Burton (2005). They list 34 indica-
tors of web-based disclosure (grouped into five 
categories: business data, forward-looking data, 
company background, intangibles, and conve-
nience). Their instruments are used since theirs 
are specially devoted to web-based disclosure of US 
publicly listed manufacturing firms . The details of 
their instruments can be seen at appendix 1. 
Proxies of independent variables, their measure-
ment method, and source of data  can be seen from 
Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1.  Independent Variables, Their Proxies, 
and the Measurement Method 
Independent 
Variable 
Proxy Measurement 
Method 
Data 
Source 
Profitability ROA EBIT/ average  
total assets 
(in percentage)  
ICMD 2005 
Percentage of 
Public Ownership 
Self evident Self evident ICMD 2005 
Size  Average 
total assets 
Average total 
assets (in million 
Rupiah) 
ICMD 2005 
Leverage DTA Long-term debt/ 
total assets (in 
percentage) 
ICMD 2005 
This research analyze the determinant factors 
of web-based disclosure practice among Indonesian 
publicly listed manufacturing firms. There are 153 
manufacturing firms listed by Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory (ICMD) 2005. Sample firms are 
selected purposively. There are two criteria to 
select the sample firms. First, sample firms must 
have positive profitability (ROA) since the depen-
dent variable (and other independent variables) 
has minimum value of null.  Second, sample firms 
must have their own websites. The two criteria 
leaves only 48 firms as the research sample. The 
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selection process of the sample can be seen from 
Table 2 below.  
Table 2. Sample Selection Process 
Explanation Amount 
Total Publicly Listed Manufacturing 
Firms 
153 
Less: Firms with Negative ROA (55) 
 Firms with Positive ROA 98 
Less: Firms do not have their own 
websites 
(50) 
Final Sample 48 
After the descriptive analysis and test of classic 
assumptions, inferential analysis will be done by 
using multiple regression analysis. The regression 
equation is as follows: 
WEB =  β0 + β 1PROFIT + β 2PUBOWN+ β 3SIZE+ β 
4LEVERAGE + ε  
Where: 
WEB = extent of web-based disclosure, PROFIT= 
profitability, PUBOWN = percentage of public 
ownership, SIZE= firm size, LEVERAGE= leve-
rage level, and ε= error term.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The descriptive statistic of variables can be 
seen at table 1.  From the table it can be deduced 
that firms’ extent of web-based disclosure (depen-
dent variable) is quite limited and varies little 
(with average value of 9.67 and standard deviation 
of 2.82). Considering that the theoretical value of 
dependent variable is 34, the average score is only 
28,4% of theoretical score. In US context, Matherly 
and Burton (2005) find that the average score of 
firms’ extent of web-based disclosure is 38% of 
theoretical score. This result shows that Indone-
sian manufacturing firms still do not utilize much 
their websites for investor relation.  
On the other hand, all dependent variables 
vary highly with PROFIT and SIZE have standard 
deviation higher than their mean. Percentage of 
public ownership is also low in Indonesian manu-
facturing firms (average 27.84%). This fact 
indicates that manufacturing firms are still 
dominated by large shareholders (corporate, finan-
cial institutions and founders) which potentially 
reduces further the public power to control mana-
gers action. Indonesian manufacturing firms also 
rely more on equity than long-term debt as 
indicated by low percentage of leverage (20.99%). 
The more complete result of descriptive statistic 
can be seen at table 3 below. 
Normality test is conducted by analyzing 
Normal Probability Plot. The analysis shows that 
data are located nearby the straight line; indicating 
that condition of normality is fulfilled. Using other 
test (Kolmogorov-Smirnof test), we find that all 
variables have significant value greater than 0.1; 
indicating that data of all variables are normally 
distributed.  
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistic of Variables 
variables N 
Mini-
mum 
Maxi-
mum 
mean st.dev 
WEB 48 5 18 9.6667 2.8234077 
PROFIT 48 0.02 40.08 6.9004 7.3682331 
PUBOWN 48 1.55 86.52 27.8396 19.757503 
SIZE 48 41792.5 33274681 2662950 5525880 
LEVERAGE  48 0.46 74.42 20.99 16.98806 
 
To detect the multicollinearity problem of the 
regression equation, we use variance inflation 
factor (VIF) score as the criteria. VIF score less 
than 10 indicates that there is no serious 
multicollinearity problem. All independent varia-
bles have VIF score less than 10 (ranging from 1.1 
to 1.25); indicating no serious multicollinearity 
problem. 
Heteroscedasticity problem is detected by 
using Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (BPG) test. The 
score of BPG Q is much less than critical value of 5 
percent chi-square with degree of freedom of 4 
(BPG Q score is 0.000; critical value chi square 
(0.95;4)=9.49).  This fact means that the model does 
not possess heteroscedasticity problem (Marwata, 
2004). 
Since the data do not violate the classical 
assumptions, the OLS regression model can be 
used to test the hypothesis. The result of regression 
analysis can be seen at Table 4.   
Based on the result, it can be deduced that 
only Ha2 that cannot be supported. It means that 
PROFIT, SIZE, and LEVERAGE, as individual 
variables, positively affect the extent of web-based 
disclosure. PUBOWN, on the otherhand, does not 
influence the dependent variable. The regression 
model itself is quite conclusive , as indicated by the 
value of adjusted R2 = 0.324 and significance value 
for overall model= 0.000 (not displayed here). 
 
Table 4 . Results of Regression Analysis 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
  
  B 
Std. 
Error 
Beta 
t 
 
Sig. 
 
(Constant) 7.031 .908 7.743 .000
PROFIT .110 .050 .286 2.201 .033
PUBOWN .012 .019 .083 .634 .530
SIZE 2.064E-07 .000 .404 3.035 .004
LEVERAGE .048 .021 .287 2.259 .029
Dependent Variable: WEB 
 
The significance of PROFIT in explaining the 
extent of web-based disclosure is consistent with 
Prabowo and Tambotoh (2005), although not 
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consistent with US/international evidence (Oyelere 
et al, 2003; Marston and Polei, 2004; Xiao et al, 
2004). The finding is also consistent with signalling 
(information-problem) theory. Profitability is good 
news for managers and outsiders. Managers of 
profitable firms can inform this information to 
market by disclosing more (by extensive voluntary 
disclosure) or by disclosing in novel technology (in 
the form of web-based disclosure). Internet enables 
firms to disclose their information at much lower 
costs and potentially reaching much more 
audience. 
The insignificance of PUBOWN is consistent 
with Marston and Polei (2004) and Prabowo and 
Tambotoh (2005). This fact can be explained that 
level of public ownership in Indonesia is quite low 
(only 27.84%), representing minority interests. 
Minority interests have less power to demand more 
extensive or novel technology of disclosure of firms’ 
information. Individual shareholders can also 
access firm’s (financial) information from more 
generic website (such as JSX website [www.jsx. 
com] and www.indoexchange.com). Another expla-
nation of the insignificance of percentage of public 
ownership is that this variable does not really 
represent the number of individual shareholders. 
Larger number of individual shareholders, and not 
larger percentage of public ownership, creates 
larger agency problems for publicly listed firms. 
Therefore, variable of percentage of public 
ownership (and its subsequent proxy) is not the 
best one to measure the degree of dispersion of 
shareholders.  
The result of regression analysis also support 
Ha3. It accumulates the supporting evidence of 
influence of firm size on the extent of web-based 
disclosure (Debreceny et al, 2002; Ettredge et al, 
2002; Oyelere et al, 2003; Prabowo and Tambotoh 
2005). Larger agency problems and political costs, 
added by economic of scale of information pro-
duction make larger firms are more willing to 
utilize website to disclose their information to 
market. 
What is surprising is that our research find 
that LEVERAGE positively affects WEB. To our 
best knowledge, ours is the first that find the 
evidence. Using Indonesian context, Prabowo and 
Tambotoh (2005) cannot support the hypothesis 
that level of leverage influences the extent of 
internet financial reporting. Our finding confirms 
the theory of agency conflict between shareholders 
and debtholders (Barnea et al, 1976). The fact that 
debt only contribute 20.99% of total capital makes 
debtholders more vulnerable from agency problems 
since they are only minority supplier of capital. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
Research on web-based disclosure using Indo-
nesian context is still limited. Ours is different 
than Prabowo and Tambotoh (2005) since they use 
the extent of internet financial reporting (to what 
extent firm upload/disclose their financial state-
ments in their websites) as dependent variable 
while ours web-based disclosure (to what extent 
firms disclose their information in their websites). 
We operationalize the dependent variable using 
Matherly and Burton’s 34 indicators.  (2003) This 
article finds that profitability, size and leverage 
positively affects the extent of web-based disclosure 
while public ownership does not.  
Our research suffers weakness usually found 
in disclosure research: it weighs each item scored 
without regarding the extent of disclosure of each 
item. Additionally, our instrument to measure the 
extent of web-based disclosure (Matherly and 
Burton’s instrument) is potentially less relevant to 
Indonesian context or to other industry. For 
example, Matherly and Burton’s indicator use 
plant volume and suppliers as the indicators of the 
level of web-based disclosure which are not 
relevant in service industry. Our attempt to mea-
sure the extent of shareholders quantitatively 
disperses also fails. It is impossible to obtain data 
on the exact number of individual shareholders. 
We have to rely on the second-best indicators 
(percentage of public ownership). Finally, future 
research can rely on noneconomics-based theory to 
explain the extent web-based disclosure (such as 
institutional theory as used by Xiao et al, 2004).  
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